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Abstract
Deep learning (DL) approaches are achieving extraordinary results in a wide
range of domains but often require a massive collection of private data. Hence,
methods for training neural networks on the joint data of different data owners,
that keep each party’s input confidential, are called for. We address the setting
of horizontally distributed data in deep learning, where the participants’ vulner-
able intermediate results have to be processed in a privacy-preserving manner.
The predominant scheme for this setting is based on homomorphic encryption
(HE), and it is widely considered to be without alternative. In contrast to
this, we demonstrate that a carefully chosen, less complex and computationally
less expensive secure sum protocol in conjunction with default secure channels
exhibits superior properties in terms of both collusion-resistance and runtime.
Finally, we discuss several open research questions in the context of collaborative
DL, which possibly might lead back to HE-based solutions.
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1. Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that the success of deep learning (DL) was made
possible, to a great extent, by increasing amounts of collected data.1 However,
massive data collection is often reserved to the technology giants from the US
or China. Therefore, collaborations to train from combined data would be
desirable for many companies and institutions. To complicate matters, many
typical applications of deep learning in collaborative settings include sensitive
private data that should not be shared in plain text. Collaborating partners
can also be competitors, for example, and more or less trusted. Thus, in such
cases, ethical and legal privacy concerns have to be considered as constraints.
Privacy-preserving data mining and machine learning takes this into account.
Privacy-preserving data mining techniques can, by and large, be divided into
perturbation and secure multi-party computation (SMC) approaches. Pertur-
bation includes randomization, k-anonymity and l-diversity and downgrading
application effectiveness. While these methods target to protect individual’s
data records from exposure, usually by modifying the input data, and require a
trade-off between effectiveness (quality of the output) and privacy, SMC tech-
niques do not affect the effectiveness. Instead, special cryptographic commu-
nication protocols allow two or more parties to obtain aggregated results from
their combined data, such that each of them does not learn any information
more than what can be derived from their common output. Yao’s protocol solv-
ing the Yao’s Millionaires’ Problem [29] is seen as the first example of SMC. In
data mining applications, SMC covers distributed privacy preserving learning
and private evaluation. In distributed or collaborative learning, the integrated
data are partitioned on multiple parties, which evaluate a function collabora-
tively and protect their shares. The data may be partitioned horizontally or
vertically. The other field of SMC is private function evaluation, where a clients
input data is processed by a server provided model in such a way that no inter-
pretable data is revealed to any counterparty.
Employing privacy-preserving techniques for stochastic gradient decent
(SGD) in deep learning is an intriguing option to develop strong machine learn-
ing models with privacy guarantees. To our knowledge, all approaches for deep
learning on horizontally partitioned data follow the same procedure: After ini-
tialization, all participants train their model locally on one batch each and aggre-
gate their gradients afterwards. The global model parameters are updated with
these gradients and then used by every participant in the next iteration. After it
has been shown that sharing even small fractions of model parameters in every
learning epoch is very vulnerable to generative adversarial networks [13, 20],
present approaches [20, 16, 25] use a technique to aggregate multiple parties’
contributions privately before sharing them. More specifically, they use different
types of secure sum protocols. Like many solutions for private evaluation with
1Other well-known enabling factors are advances with algorithms, mature software libraries,
and the availability of highly parallel hardware.
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DNNs, most of the employed secure sum protocols in collaborative DL are based
on homomorphic encryption techniques (HE). HE enables addition and/or mul-
tiplication of encrypted values without a decryption-key and is therefore ubiq-
uitous in privacy preserving algorithms. Their use increases computation and
communication costs, but it is feasible in many applications. In collaborative
deep learning on several parties’ inputs, where much data are processed, a draw-
back of HE, as used by Phong et al. [20], is its weakness against collusion attacks
when maintaining reasonable costs. Ping Li et al. [17, 16] and Tang et al. [25]
provide collusion-resistance by a multi-key and re-encryption scheme, respec-
tively, but require a non-colluding authorization centre (trusted third party).
Other collusion-resistant secure aggregation methods as introduced by Urabe et
al. [26] seem to be be more suitable, because of lower costs and less requirements
under two non-restrictive assumptions:
• There is no need for a central third-party server, which must not see the
global model parameters.
• It is possible to establish pairwise secure channels, e.g., using transport
layer security (TLS).
The approach we are encouraging can either include a central download server
that is given the same security restrictions as any other party and therefore, can
see the global parameters after each iteration, or it can schedule the distribution
of aggregated results in a decentralized way. We think that this is feasible
in practice. A trend of secure sum research is to guarantee security without
secure channels thanks to HE [14, 27]. But as it is easy to implement secure
paired connections using established TLS connections, the need of being able to
communicate without secure channels in complex computations as collaborative
DL might be rare. More interestingly, HE could be promising for providing full
privacy by working on encrypted intermediate results directly and decrypting
the final results only. But to our knowledge, due to insufficient performance,
this has not been implemented yet for DNNs.
In this paper, we revive the early but unrecognized approach of N.
Schliter [23], which is based on a simple secure sum protocol and does not
require any intense public-key encryption. Replacing its secure sum building
block by the secure sum algorithm of Urabe et al. [26], all private inputs are
provably indistinguishable from uniformly distributed random numbers even if
up to n − 2 of n parties maliciously collude. There is no need for a trusted
third party. Additionally, our experiments and calculations show that this ap-
proach combined with basic symmetric key encryption leads to significantly
reduced computation costs compared to HE-based approaches in collaborative
deep learning.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide
an overview of some secure sum protocols with and without HE as a building
block of many privacy preserving applications. Section 3 discusses different
privacy-preserving deep learning frameworks – especially on horizontally par-
titioned data – and introduces a new advantageous combination of Schliter’s
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scheme [23] and the secure sum protocol of Urabe et al. [26]. We elaborate the
efficiency properties of our suggestion with experimental and theoretical analy-
sis in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and outlines some open
research questions.
2. Secure Sum Protocols
As a building block for many applications, secure sum is a common example
of SMC. In secure sum, n parties have a private input xi, i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n − 1}
each and want to determine the sum y =
∑n−1
i=0 xi in such a way that no party
learns anything but what can be revealed from its own input and the output
y. Presuming no collusion, the problem can be solved straightforwardly as
described by Clifton et al. [7]:
1. After choosing a limit l known to be greater than y, a selected master side
draws a random number r from a uniform distribution in the range [0, l).
2. The master side, denoted as p0, sends s0 = x0 + r mod l to the second
party.
3. The parties pi∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1} sequentially send si = si−1 + xi mod l
to party pi+1 mod n.
4. Finally, p0 receives sn−1 and broadcasts the result y = sn−1 − r mod l,
which is r +
∑n−1
i=0 xi − r mod l =
∑n−1
i=0 xi, to all other parties.
Clearly, the two adjacent parties pi−1 and pi+1 mod n of pi can calculate xi by
subtracting si−1 from si if they collude. This can be prevented by splitting
each xi into different segments and performing the secure sum protocol for each
segment separately in a permuted order. Zhu et al. [30] proposed a k-secure sum
protocol that guarantees zero-leakage, if any two parties collude by splitting
each xi into k segments. Additionally, it reduces the probability of information
leakage vastly depending on the parameter k.
In the following, we briefly outline the secure sum approach of Urabe et
al. [26]. It consists of three phases:
1. Distribution phase. For each pi ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1} do:
• divide xi randomly into n− i shares sji , such that
n−1∑
j=i
sji = xi.
• send sji to pj∀j ∈ {i+ 1, i+ 2, ..., n− 1}.
2. Merging phase. For each pi ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1} do:
• calculate y′i =
i∑
j=1
sij .
• send y′i to p0.
3. Collection phase. For p0 do:
• calculate the result y = (x0 +
n−1∑
i=1
y′i)
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(a) distribution phase (b) collection phase
Figure 1: Communications in secure cum protocol of Urabe et al. [26] for n = 4
• return / broadcast y
Figure 1 illustrates the communications for n = 4. In the end, party p0
receives the final result y and broadcasts it, so that all parties receive it. The
communication costs are n(n − 1)b/2 bits in total for inputs of the size b bits.
By reducing the maximum number of shares of any xi to k+1 ≤ n−1 instead of
n− 1, the communication costs can be further reduced to a linear function that
depends on a constant k. At the same time, the collusion-resistance is reduced
to at least k colluding parties. It is sometimes recommended to choose k in the
order of lnn to gain a sufficiently small probability of collusion [14]. Jung and
Li [14] claim that the secure sum protocol of Clifton et al. [7] and other previous
protocols require an initialization phase during which participants request keys
from key issuers via secure channel, and assume this could be a security risk.
They introduce a secure product protocol, which is based on the hardness of the
discrete logarithm problem, and transfer the private sum problem to a private
product problem. In this way, a (computationally) secure sum can be performed
without the need for pairwise secure channels. Other more recently published
protocols [18, 27], fulfilling the property of collusion-resistance for more than two
parties, build on homomorphic encryption techniques (HE). HE allows additions
or multiplications of ciphertexts on any two numbers m1 and m2 that have
been encrypted by an encryption function Enc(x). In additive HE, a practical
modulus operator ⊕ is known with the property
Enc(m1 +m2) = Enc(m1)⊕ Enc(m2). (1)
One example of an additive homomorphic cryptosystem is the assymmetric Pail-
lier cryptosystem [19], which is used by Phong et al. [20] in DL. It provides the
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useful additional property:
Enc(k ∗m1) = k ∗ Enc(m1). (2)
Likewise, in multiplicative HE cryptosystems, there is a modulus operator ⊗,
such that
Enc(m1 ∗m2) = Enc(m1)⊗ Enc(m2). (3)
Mehnaz et al. [18] and Vu et al. [27] employ a variant of the originally
multiplicative homomorphic ElGamal Encryption [10], that is based on the
Diffie-Hellmann encryption [8] and even fulfills the property Enc(m1 ∗ m2) =
Enc(m1) ∗Enc(m2). The former article provides collusion-resistant anonymiza-
tion, which means that segments are permuted before addition and only k + 1
parties can determine the origin of segments. The protocol of Vu et al. [27]
is based on a multi-party sum function employing a variant of ElGamal en-
cryption, and a Schnorr signature-derived authentication method. In contrast
to other approaches, these and some other HE-based protocols do not require
pairwise secure channels but can be directly used on public networks. On the
downside, these protocols require many computationally expensive modular ex-
ponentiations. We show in section 4 that in applications which require many
secure aggregations, establishing secure channels can be much cheaper than
using HE-based secure sum.
3. Privacy Preserving Deep Learning
Deep Neural Networks. We develop a distributed, privacy-preserving learning
scheme for deep neural networks. We assume a standard feed-forward neural
network trained with back-propagation [22] and batch normalization, where
each update step is performed for a batch B of |B| data records. Let ∆W lij(d)
denote the change of the weight W lij between the nodes i of layer l and j of layer
l + 1 caused by the data record d, the total change of W lij in a training step is
∆W lij =
∑
d∈B
∆W lij(d) = −η
∑
d∈B
Glij(d). (4)
∆W lij(d) is a product of a learning rate η and the partial derivative G
l
ij(d) of
the error, e.g., mean squared error, with respect to W lij(d).
Privacy Preserving Deep Learning. Like privacy preserving data mining in gen-
eral, privacy preserving DL can be divided into different subareas. In the field
of perturbation methods, Abadi et al. [1], introduced an (-)differential pri-
vate training algorithm for stochastic gradient decent (SGD) that adds noise
and accounts the privacy loss. As typical for perturbation-induced privacy ap-
proaches, this leads to a trade-off between accuracy and the individual records’
privacy. As we focus on SMC methods in this paper, we do not refer to further
perturbation-based approaches.
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A lot of articles have been published about private function evaluation with
DNNs [12, 5, 16, 4, 21, 15]. A server trains a DNN and offers an evaluation
service on a client’s data. Neither shall the client receive any more information
than the evaluation output nor shall the server be able to infer the client’s input
data. A common strategy is to approximate all non-linear functions by piece-
wise linear ones and employ HE to privately evaluate on the altered DNN. The
accuracy loss is low and the computation is feasible in practice, because only two
parties and typically just one input vector at once are involved. However, state-
of-the-art frameworks rather use hybrids of garbled circuits and secret sharing
techniques.
In the field of collaborative DL, where the training data are distributed
among several data owners, we distinguish between horizontally and vertically
partitioned data. Chen and Zhong [6] consider vertically partitioned data among
two parties, which own different features of common training samples. They use
the ElGamal encryption scheme to securely compute (1) the piece-wise linear
approximation function of the sigmoid activation function of two input sum-
mands and (2) the product of two small integers. Both procedures return a
random share s1 to one party and another share s2 to the other party, so that
s1 + s2 = y. These shares and initial weights are propagated through a DNN.
At the end of each batch, the random shares are aggregated and the weight
updates are shared in plain text and used for the next round. Bansal et al. [2]
extend this approach by the use of the Paillier encryption-based scalar product
algorithm of Wright and Yang [28], in such a way that no intermediate results
have to be exchanged but random shares. As a result, only the final weights
learned by the DNN are leaked in this model. The main contribution of this
method is its ability to handle arbitrarily partitioned data of two parties.
Collaborative Deep Learning on Horizontally Partitioned Data. Recent research
in collaborative DL concentrates on DL with horizontally partitioned data. We
assume this is due to less complex operation and higher demand in real-world
scenarios. Many publications (e.g., Shoki et al. [24]) experimentally demonstrate
that combining data records of the same kind horizontally can increase the per-
formance of all parties considerably, since it causes more generality and reduces
overfitting. A training step on a batch of samples consists of a feed-forward and
a back-propagation run. The input of a training step are η, B and the weights
from a previous step Wˆ . Let Bi denote the set of samples of B that are owned by
party pi and let Gi be the vector of all partial derivatives (gradients) obtained
from Bi. To our knowledge, all publications on DL with horizontally partitioned
data [24, 23, 20, 25, 18, 17, 16, 27] leverage the property that updates of model
parameters are the sum of updates caused by its individual batch samples (see
Equation 4). Hence, the weight changes caused by individual samples of a party
can be calculated independently from the other parties’ samples within a batch.
The same is done in asynchronous stochastic gradient decent (ASGD) based
learning, where the goal is not to preserve privacy but to distribute work load.
The prerequisite is that all parties input the same copy of Wˆ and preferably
the same value of η as well. Ideally, |Bi| = |B|/n applies. This leads to the
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Figure 2: Basic structure of present deep learning on horizontally partitioned data
following general steps of a training procedure for collaborative deep learning
on horizontally partitioned data:
1. Sharing of initial parameters.
2. Local training by each party with input Wˆ ,Bi
3. Privacy preserving aggregation of all Gi and update of Wˆ
4. Repetition of steps 2 to 3 until termination condition is met (see below).
The initial parameters should be consistent among the parties. Since the param-
eters are usually independent of the input and randomly generated, any party
can broadcast them straightforwardly. Subsequently, every party performs a
training step on a number of private samples and computes the gradients caused
by its private input Bi. In Step 3, a privacy preserving aggregation algorithm
is used to securely compute
W = Wˆ − η
n−1∑
i=0
∑
d∈Bi
Gi(d). (5)
Figure 2 illustrates the learning loop. The termination condition can be either
a fixed number of iterations or dependent on the loss function. In the latter
case, the global loss difference has to be measured regularly. Since the global
loss difference is the sum of every party’s loss values, it can easily be calculated
in a privacy preserving manner by employing a secure sum protocol again.
The main differences of diverse privacy preserving collaborative approaches
are how the aggregation of weight updates works. In the following, we briefly
point out the differences:
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Shokri and Shmatikov [24] published one of the first discussed articles on
collaborative DL with horizontally partitioned training data. They introduce a
central semi-honest server that holds the global weights, which the data owners
download and update constantly. No cryptographic tool is used for parameter
update aggregation, but only a selected fraction of local gradients, e.g., 0.1 or
0.01, after each local batch are asynchronously uploaded. These omissions of
parameters reduces the accuracy, but the authors claim that the accuracy loss
compared to a fully united dataset is acceptable.
After it has been proven that using this method with setting the fraction
of uploaded parameters to even one per cent only is vulnerable to generative
adversarial network attacks [13, 20], Phong et al. [20] applied additive HE
(namely Learning With Errors (LWE), and Paillier-based encryption alterna-
tively), before uploading gradients on the server. The server holds the encryted
global weights but does not have the private key to decrypt it. Because of the
HE property, it can still add encrypted weight updates of the data owners. We
point out that, if an honest-but-curious cloud server and any other party collude,
the weight updates of any party can be decrypted with the private key known to
the other party. Furthermore, the computation is much more expensive because
all communications have to be asymmetrically encrypted.
Tang et al. [25] introduced a homomorphic re-encryption scheme [9] to
ASGD-based deep learning, which operates with two cloud servers. One cloud
server operates as a data service provider (DSP) and the other one operates as a
key transform server (KTS). This protects the weight updates against collusions
of any private-key holding learning participant and one of the cloud servers. The
authors assume that two cloud servers would not collude for competitive reasons
and higher security standards. Ping Li et al. [17] follow a similar approach.
An earlier, not peer reviewed and not implemented preprint of N.
Schliter [23] is barely considered in present publications, although it has some
beneficial properties. Instead of bothering a third party, the weight updates are
added up decentralized using a generic secure sum protocol with an adjustable
collusion-resistance parameter k, 0 < k < n− 1. Replacing the secure sum pro-
tocol by the optimized one employed by Urabe et al. [26], the input of any pa
cannot be disclosed if less than all parties but pa itself collude, which meets the
definition of SMC and the same inter-participants collusion-resistance as in the
paper of Tang et al. [25]. Since the communication is not encrypted, it requires
secure channels, e.g., using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). In the
following, we refer to this composition as SUA (Schliter-Urabe-AES).
Table 1 contrasts the collusion-resistance of SUA with the HE alternatives
of Phong et al. [20] and Tang et al. [25]. In section 4, we compare their com-
munication and computation costs.
We note that to our knowledge there is still no approach for more than two
parties that matches the strict definition of secure multi computing SMC, that
nothing should be disclosed than what can be inferred from the own input and
the output, because intermediate results are shared.
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Scheme Parties collusion-resistance
LWE [20] pi’s, DSP low : yes, if DSP does not collude with any pi
and secure channels are used
HRES [25] pi’s, DSP, KTS medium: yes, if DSP and KTS do not collude
SUA pi’s strong : yes, if pairwise secure channels are used
Table 1: Involved parties and security properties of privacy preserving distributed DL frame-
works: DSP is the data service provider and KTS the key transform server.
4. Performance Analysis
In this section, we compare the communication and computation costs of the
LWE-based scheme of Phong et al. [20] and the HRES-based scheme of Tang et
al. [25] with the split-and-merge-based scheme of N. Schliter [23]. We refer to
the scheme of N. Schliter [23] as SUA, because we modified it in two ways: (1)
We replaced the original secure sum protocol by the one of Urabe et al. [26],
because it has lower communication costs and its security properties have been
proven. (2) We encrypt all communications in SUA with the Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (AES), the popular symmetric key scheme that is widely used,
e.g., to transfer internet traffic securely. We omit the computationally negligible
step of generating and exchanging initial keys and other initialization steps in
this paper.
Experimental setup. As in related articles [20, 25, 23], we consider a default
DNN with four layers and 109,386 parameters in total, represent each parameter
by b = 32 bits and consider a communication bandwidth of 1 Gbps. We used
the Tensorflow 1.5 library for model training, input images of 28×28 pixels with
|B| = 50, and implemented SUA in Python employing the AES package of the
PyCryptodome libary2 in ECB mode to encrypt all communications. We used
a recommended [11, 3] key size of 128 bits for AES encryption. Unfortunately,
the authors of the LWE-based sheme [20] and HRES-based scheme [25] did not
share their implementations with us, because the methods are patented or code
is proprietary, and based on the published information we were not able to
reconstruct their reported results. Thus, we had to compare with the published
results and limit our hardware in a way that it cannot be faster than the one used
in the original experiments, to achieve a meaningful comparison. We ran our
experiments on an Intel Xeon W3565 CPU without any hardware accelerations
or GPU usage and limited the clock frequency to 3.2 GHz, which is equivalent
to the maximum of the CPU used by Tang et al. [25] and slightly lower than
the maximum frequency of Phong et al. [20]. We ran all experiments on a single
thread unless otherwise stated. However, all compared approaches are similarly
parallelizable. In their experiment, Tang et al. [25] use a key length of 1024 bits
2https://github.com/Legrandin/pycryptodome, visited on 18/12/2019
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Gradient aggregation and broadcast communication costs factor
LWE [20]
n ∗ nlwe ∗ log2 q
|W | ∗ b +
log2 q
b
≈ 3.07
HRES [25] 2|W | + 6 ≈ 6
SUA n− 14 2.25
Table 2: Increase of communication costs in general (second column) and with the given
settings (third column)
for HRES and a private key with 128 bits. For the LWE-based method, the
authors [20] used a similar private key and a public key of 3000 bits.
Communication costs. For every batch and each party, there is one download
and one upload of all gradients. With the aforementioned parameter settings,
the upload size (and download size too) of a non-privacy-preserving distributed
learning step is
|W | ∗ b = 109, 386 ∗ 32 bits ≈ 437.5 kB. (6)
Table 2 lists the factor of increase of these communication costs of the three
privacy-preserving schemes. In the Paillier-based scheme t integers are packed
into one plaintext in order to encrypt them more efficiently into one ciphertext,
which is encoded with far more than b bits. Therefore, pad padding bits are
added to each integer to avoid overflows. As in the original article [20], we insert
pad = 15 and the security-sensitive parameter settings nlwe = 3000, q = 2
77 into
the formulas for an estimation. Since the communication costs of the secure sum
by Urabe et al. [26] are (n(n− 1)/2) ∗ b bits, it is ((n− 1)/2) ∗ b bits on average
for each party. By passing the distributor role p1 regularly, the communication
costs can be balanced uniformly among the participants. Consequently, SUA
does not require a central server, because the learning participants receive the
sum directly during the aggregation procedure. Hence, aggregation and broad-
cast are performed in a single step and the factor of increase compared to a
corresponding ASGD algorithm is (n− 1)/4.
Computation costs. With the assumed network bandwidth of 1 Gbps, the com-
munication runtime for one iteration of a corresponding ASGD algorithm with
n distributed cores is:
2 ∗ 437.5 kB/1 Gbps ∗ n = 7.0 ms ∗ n. (7)
The communication costs of the privacy-preserving increase by the factors in
Table 2. Table 3 contrasts the total runtimes of the LWE-based scheme by
Phong et al. [20], the HRES-based scheme by Tang et al. [25] and our mea-
surements for SUA and a non-private ASGD iteration for n = 10. The sum
per learning participants (
∑
per pi) consists of the local training, encryption
and decryption, and communication for one pi taking one thread per learning
participant. In case of SUA, the costs for the secure sum protocol count in
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Scheme train. encr. add. decr. commun.
∑
per pi DSP+KTS
∑
total
LWE [20] 4.6 899.2 - 785.4 214.9 190.4 278.9 2183.0
HRES [25] 1.3 1112.4 - 584.1 420.0 211.8 3496.0 5613.8
SUA 1.5 118.2 69.9 108.6 157.5 45.6 - 455.7
Non priv. 1.5 - - - 70.0 7.2 1.0 72.5
Table 3: Runtime (ms) for one iteration (W = 109, 386) with n = 10, 1 thread
Figure 3: Total runtime (without operations done by DSP and KTS and k = n − 1) for one
iteration (|W | = 109, 386) using 1 thread
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this measure, because the addition is performed decentralized. Whereas in the
other cases we exclude it, because a DSP does the addition, which has usually
more computational capacity according to the argumentation of Tang et al. [25].
For the same reason, we also exclude the operations performed by the KTS in
HRES here. In our experiment in Table 3, SUA’s cryptographic overhead leads
to a 6-fold increase of computation costs compared to a non-private federated
learning solution. But even when considering the communication and partici-
pants computation only, SUA causes 4-5 times less runtime compared to both
HE-based schemes for n = 10.
Figure 3 contrasts the total runtime without DSP and KTS, calculated for
one iteration for different values of n. We calculated the runtimes for encryp-
tion, decryption and communication in the cloud server approaches by assuming
constant time per pi and assumed a constant local time for training because |B|
remains constant. As expected, the runtime of SUA per pi increases with grow-
ing n because the costs for encrypted communication per pi are proportional
to n − 1. However, the level of collusion resistance can be limited to a fixed
security parameter k, such that the protocol is secure against any collusion of
up to k instead of n−1 participants. With a fixed k, runtime for the secure sum
protocol and its communications per pi remains constant. For k < 139, SUA
remains the fastest privacy-preserving procedure, even when ignoring costs for
the DSP and KTS and collusion resistance. For k ≥ 139, a hierarchical scheme
along the same lines could be envisaged.
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5. Conclusion
Homomorphic encryption is a powerful, versatile tool, but applied to asym-
metric encryption, it is often computationally costly. In the field of SMC, other
techniques should not be neglected. We demonstrate the advantages of alter-
natives in the example of DL on horizontally partitioned data. Instead of 2.5
hours with 20 threads (10 cores) [20] with HE based protocols, we can train a
default DNN in 6 to 35 minutes (for n ∈ {3, 4, ..., 20}) with 4 threads employing
a simple but even fully collusion secure sum protocol.
Still, in this field, future work could exploit the HE property to prevent
disclosure of any intermediate results. The risk of violating privacy by sharing
aggregated intermediate results has not been evaluated yet. HE has the chance
to perform the whole training on encrypted data. Therefore, more efficient
approaches should be developed. HE techniques for symmetric keys might be
an option. Another open question concerns vertically or arbitrarily partitioned
data for more than two parties.
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